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In the last two decades, the possibility of extending human lifespan has been
a highly debated topic by both biomedical scientists (de Grey and Rae, 2007;
Olshansky and Carnes, 2002) and philosophers (Agar, 2010; Overall, 2003). I
propose an alternative framework to clarify diﬀerent categories in the theoretical
literature. This model builds upon the distinctions that Juengst and collabora-
tors (2003), and Wareham (2016) make about the levels of human senescence
and means to control it. In addition, I incorporate the classic perspective of
Callahan (Stock and Callahan, 2004) as a diﬀerent counterpoint. Besides this,
I have to introduce some notions which are basic to understand my proposal.
Firstly, I compare these previous approaches with my own perspective:
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This model comprises the following mix of conceptual categories:
a) Prolonged Senescence: involves the prolongation of life without atten-
tion to age-related diseases and pathologies or the health span.
b) Compressed of Morbidity: involves the prolongation of life without
the burden of lifetime illness since it can be conﬁned to a shorter period
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before the time of death at the same time that the age of onset of the
ﬁrst chronic inﬁrmity can be postponed a little later. The objective is
not to delay aging but rather to extend the health span. It is applied to
age-related diseases like Alzheimer or cancer, and age- associated patholo-
gies like muscle-wasting. On Callahan's scheme, this model is represented
by two categories. He describes The Natural Progress Model: trying to
understand the aging process in the same way that we are doing in cu-
rrent medicine. In favor of improving the quality of life of the elderly (...)
(Stock and Callahan, 2004, 56). Then, he oﬀers another scenario, which
he labeled as The Normalizing Model: trying to reduce premature death
and trying that more people reach the 85 years that Japanese women ha-
ve maximum life expectancy (Stock and Callahan, 2004, 556). I consider
the two levels of Callahan at the same level as he focuses on improving
the quality of life. Nevertheless, if we live healthier, we will extend our
live expectancies a couple years (perhaps to the 85 year life expectancy of
contemporary Japanese women).
c) Decelerated Aging: is what de Grey has labeled Strategies for Enginee-
red Negligible Senescence or SENS (version 1.0 or beta phase): it involves
the prolongation of life with less degradation of the cognitive and physical
function of the organism due to the eﬀects of aging. A decelerated aging
clock would still move through all the normal phases of senescence, me-
rely at a slower rate, extending life expectancy and health span. This is
the same as de Grey (2004) is talking about when he describes the type
of life extension that will be required to reach what he calls Longevity
Escape Velocity (LEV). On his view, we only need to slow down aging
long enough for science to mature enough to take us into the next model.
De Grey claims that LEV will provide (SENS 1.0) 20 additional years
from the increase of 30% healthy life. On Callahan's scheme, this model
is represented by two categories. He describes The Optimalizing Model as:
trying to get more people to reach the 122 years that Jeanne Calment
lived. It is a realistic goal in so far as there have been super-centenarians
over time (Stock and Callahan, 2004, 556). Then, he oﬀers a more hypot-
hetical scenario, which he labeled as The Maximizing Model: trying to
extend the double of our life expectancy (Stock and Callahan, 2004, 556).
Obviously, The Optimizing Model seems more feasible. However, we could
imagine a life of about 160 years without eliminating aging completely.
d) Arrested Aging: (A in Juengst's model and in my own model) or SENS
(version 2.0 or ultimate phase): involves the complete control of the aging
process. This is the same as de Grey (2004) postulated: LEV will improve
the limits or errors until it is a deﬁnitive set of therapies against aging. On
this category, a person born after the availability of arrested aging inter-
ventions might live 1,000 years without senescence, as long as they avoid
other causes of death, such as dehydration, fatal disease, or starvation.
e) Rejuvenation: involves not only the complete elimination of the aging
process but it is also capable of turning back our biological clock to early
biological stages. We will enjoy a full cellular and molecular health and our
aesthetic and physical appearance will be returned to what we look like
at whatever age we choose, whether that is as a more robust and active
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elder, a mentally mature young adult, or a growing adolescent, or even an
immature child. One could then turn on and oﬀ one's aging process as
one wished, or even return one's body to previous ages (to try some new
lifestyle or somatic fashion).
Now, I present four reasons why my own model diﬀers from the others that I
have described in this section (Juengst et al., 2003; Wareham, 2016).
First, no one advocates more research in order to perpetuate a state of Pro-
longed Senescence that would merely extend the lives of the old without mi-
tigating the degenerative eﬀects of aging (Glannon, 2009). Thereupon, no one
endorses the social consequences that would result from what Fukuyama calls
the national nursing home scenario, in which people routinely live to be 150
but spend the last ﬁfty years in a state of childlike dependence on caretakers
(2002, 69).
Second, unlike Wareham (2016), I also think that a comprehensive model of
life extension should include Compression of Morbidity. The possibility of
extending life can also be achieved if we are able to control (and even, eliminate)
some or all of the age-related diseases. It is one thing to ﬁght against aging and
another is to try to counteract the virulence of Alzheimer or some types of
cancer.
Third, unlike Juengst and collaborators (2003), I also think that a comprehensi-
ve model of life extension should include Rejuvenation. The possibility of elimi-
nating aging and a maximizing health span are in the gerontological literature
but a person may ask: if SENS arrives when I am older, who will I see when I
look in the mirror?
At the other end of the taxonomy, I also ignore that a comprehensive model of
life extension should include Arresting Aging (B in Wareham's model) and Es-
caping Aging (or Death) (Wareham, 2016) entirely, by achieving immortality
or resurrection. For two reasons: (1) it is a utopia with almost no scientiﬁc basis
that serves more for projecting philosophical speculations than other things; (2)
the only way to achieve these goals would be to forego our physical bodies enti-
rely, such as by integration (partial or complete) with the machine; for example,
mind uploading in the last level. This diﬀers from the nature of the other levels,
and raises issues outside the scope of the debate over biomedical life extension.
Finally, the model that I am proposing in the table above builds on these catego-
ries, but improves upon Juengst and collaborators (2003) and Wareham (2016)
models in several ways:
Flexibility: it is open to add or restructure categories with the evolving of
gerontology. Its maxim is to focus on aging and senescence; therefore, there are
not all the possibilities to live longer (or forever). Overlap: there is a conti-
nuity between each of the categories since there is no substantial gap between
them. For example, between Compression of Morbidity and Decelerated Aging
(we may think that we have delayed senescence but we have only slowed down
the appearance of age-related diseases) or if de Grey (2004) develops his entire
research project (from SENS 1.0 to SENS 2.0). Levels of fantasy: is intermin-
gled with established science in this model. It spans medicine's current eﬀorts
to prevent late-life disease and the craziest ideas of charlatans in this ﬁeld. Alt-
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hough categories (a, b, and c) is, understandable in terms of the status quo
and ongoing science, it takes a strong tolerance for fantasy to envision what is
meant categories (d and e). The realistic aspiration does not consist of elimina-
ting aging or reversing aging (Bostrom, 2005; de Grey and Rae, 2007; Harris,
2007; Kurzweil, 2005).
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